Internet Censorship in the Arab Spring Countries Explained

During the Arab Spring, governments in several countries employed internet censorship to suppress dissenting voices and maintain control over information.

In Egypt, the government shut down the internet during the 2011 protests, effectively disconnecting over 80 million people from the global network.

This drastic measure was taken to prevent protesters from organizing and sharing information about the protests.

In Tunisia, the government used a combination of technical and non-technical methods to censor the internet, including blocking websites and monitoring online activity.

The Tunisian government also arrested and prosecuted individuals for posting content critical of the government online.

The Arab Spring was a pivotal moment in the region's history, and Internet censorship played a significant role in the events that unfolded.

In Tunisia, widespread Internet censorship was detected in 2010 by Alkasir, a website that monitored online activity. This censorship did not extend to Facebook, which was used to mobilize resistance against the dictator Ben Ali.

Facebook and Twitter were blocked in Egypt, leading to a surge in demand for Alkasir. The use of Alkasir plummeted in Tunisia after Ben Ali fled the country in January 2011, but it increased in Egypt as people sought alternative ways to communicate.

The Syrian Uprising saw a tightening of censorship, which in turn led to a surge in the use of Alkasir. This was particularly evident when large numbers of defectors gave up their support of the regime or when the Free Syrian Army mounted an offensive.

Alkasir remained free for all to use, with no marketing efforts or advertising on the website. This independence and non-commercial nature increased its credibility among users.

Additional reading: Internet in Egypt

Social media giants like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube have arbitrary and non-transparent content moderation policies that often silence political speech of oppressed communities. They can remove content or suspend accounts without explanation, leaving users in the dark.

In Syria, Facebook disabled thousands of anti-Assad accounts documenting war crimes since 2011 under the pretext of removing terrorist content. This action is a stark contrast to their earlier touted role as upholders of free speech.

YouTube has also erased archives of human rights violations' evidence and documentation, further limiting the ability of activists to share their stories and hold those in power accountable.

Online surveillance has become a major concern in the Arab world, with governments investing millions of dollars in surveillance technology and spyware to target human rights defenders and internet activists.

The NSO's Pegasus spyware is one of the most notorious technologies used to spy on activists and journalists, turning infected phones into small spies in pockets.

This sophisticated and invasive technology allows access to a target's private data, including contact lists, passwords, emails, text messages, voice calls, calendar, and browsing history.

It can also turn on the phone's camera and microphone to spy on the target without their knowledge.

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The spyware has been used to target human rights defenders like Ahmed Mansour in the UAE and Saudi activists in exile, including colleagues of Jamal Khashoggi.

Moroccan activist and journalist Omar Radi is also a recent victim, facing bogus charges of espionage and sexual assault.

The Arab Spring sparked global discussions on the need for more robust export controls of digital surveillance technology, but progress has been modest.

The surveillance market has continued to thrive with no transparency or accountability, especially when human rights violations are committed using these tools by repressive regimes.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, has called for an immediate moratorium on the sale, transfer, and use of surveillance technology until human rights-compliant regulatory frameworks are in place.

Related reading: Internet Censorship and Surveillance in Europe

Social media giants have turned their back on Arab activists, abandoning their promise to uphold free speech. They have implemented arbitrary and non-transparent content moderation policies that often result in silencing political speech of oppressed communities.

Thousands of activists and ordinary users have had their content removed or accounts suspended without explanation. This has happened in countries such as Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine.

Facebook disabled thousands of Syrian anti-Assad accounts documenting war crimes since 2011 under the pretext of removing terrorist content from the platform. This move has raised concerns about the platform's willingness to prioritize profit over people's rights.

YouTube has also erased archives of human rights violations' evidence and documentation, further highlighting the issue of unchecked power in determining who can and can't speak on these platforms.

Saudi Arabia has infiltrated Twitter by recruiting two of its U.S. staff to spy on Saudi dissidents and share their private data with the Saudi government. This is a stark reminder of the cozy relationship between social media platforms and governments.

The Arab Spring was a pivotal moment in history, where the Internet played a significant role in mobilizing resistance against oppressive regimes.

In Tunisia, far-reaching Internet censorship was detected by Alkasir in 2010, but Facebook remained uncensored, allowing for resistance mobilization. The censorship ceased when dictator Ben Ali fled the country in January 2011, and Alkasir's use plummeted.

The unrest spread to Egypt, where both Facebook and Twitter were blocked, leading to a surge in Alkasir's use. This highlights the importance of alternative platforms in times of censorship.

Egypt's revolution began with a wave of protests in Tahrir Square, sparked by the government's decision to raise food prices and the subsequent arrest of a young woman for allegedly insulting the president.

This event marked a turning point in the country's history, as it brought together a diverse group of Egyptians from different backgrounds and age groups, all united by their desire for change.

The government's response to the protests was to impose a blackout on social media and mobile networks, in an attempt to silence the protesters and limit the spread of information.

In January 2011, the government shut down the internet and mobile networks for several days, effectively cutting off the flow of information to and from the country.

The Egyptian government also used its control of the media to shape public opinion and demonize the protesters, labeling them as "terrorists" and "foreign agents".

The government's efforts to suppress the protests were ultimately unsuccessful, as the protesters continued to organize and mobilize, using alternative means of communication and social media to spread their message.

As the protests continued to grow, the government was forced to concede, and on February 11, 2011, President Hosni Mubarak resigned, marking the end of his 30-year rule.

Arab informants were strong supporters of censorship within areas such as anti-religious content, nudity, and pornography. This is in contrast to non-Arab users who disagreed with censorship of these topics.

In fact, non-Arabs objected to censorship within seven of the eleven areas, while Arabs only objected to three. This suggests that Arab culture has a different perspective on censorship.

The Islamic influence on Arab culture may be one reason for this difference in views. By not allowing Alkasir to become a tool for accessing pornography, for example, users can avoid personal risks and reputation problems.

Interestingly, opposition against censorship of the expression of political views was stronger among Arabs than among non-Arabs. This shows that Arabs value freedom of expression and want to speak freely without fear of reprisals.

Governments in the Arab world used e-censorship to block online content and monitor citizens' online activities during the Arab Spring.

The Egyptian government, for example, used a system called "Deep Packet Inspection" to monitor and block online traffic.

Citizens were also targeted by phishing attacks, which were used to steal their personal information.

The Bahraini government used a tool called "SmartFilter" to block access to opposition websites and social media platforms.

These tools were often used in conjunction with traditional forms of censorship, such as blocking websites and arresting activists.

The use of e-censorship was widespread, with many countries in the region employing similar tactics.

The Egyptian government's use of e-censorship was particularly aggressive, with reports of citizens being arrested for posting anti-government content online.

In Bahrain, the government used e-censorship to target specific individuals and groups, rather than broadly blocking online content.

The use of e-censorship during the Arab Spring highlights the importance of online freedom and the need for governments to be transparent about their online activities.